In this paper, we demonstrate how model checking can be used to verify safety properties for eventdriven systems. SCR tabular requirements describe required system behavior in a format that is intuitive, easy to read, and scalable to large systems (e.g., the software requirements for the A7 aircraft). Model checking of temporal logics has been established as a sound technique for verifying properties of hardware systems. We have developed an automated technique for formalizing the semi-formal SCR requirements and for transforming the resultant formal speci cation onto a nite structure that a model checker can analyze. This technique was e ective in uncovering violations of system invariants in both an automobile cruise control system and a water-level monitoring system.
Introduction
A software requirements document is usually the rst speci cation of a system's required behavior. Errors in this document are di cult and expensive to correct if propagated to the design phase (or worse, to the implementation) 24]. Designers must be able to formally analyze requirements before system design begins.
A requirements speci cation is a behavioral speci cation of the system's activities; it describes the system's modes of operation and the events that cause the system to change modes. The speci cation often includes a set of safety assertions that must also be enforced. These assertions are invariant properties of the system, so they should also be properties of the requirements speci cation. As such, they are redundant information that can be used to verify that the requirements are internally consistent.
Temporal logic and model checking have been used to verify safety properties in hardware systems 6, 11] . The hardware system is portrayed as a logical model, and safety assertions are represented as logical formulas. One assumes that if a formula is true in the model, then the safety assertion holds in the hardware system. One reason that this veri cation technique is so promising is that model checking can be automated for some temporal logics.
This paper demonstrates the feasibility of using model checking to analyze safety properties of software requirements. Our analysis technique combines the SCR requirements speci cation language 1, 19, 18] with the CTL model checker 8, 5] . SCR requirements are intuitive, easy to write and change, and scalable to large systems (e.g., the software requirements for the A7 aircraft 1]). The CTL model checker is an automated analyzer that has been used successfully to verify properties of hardware systems 6]. The result is a formal method whose speci cation language is easy read and understand, and whose analysis is automated. Section 2 of this paper reviews event-oriented requirements speci cations and state-based model checking, and presents our algorithm for constructing state-based models of event-oriented system requirements. Section 3 describes two case studies of event-oriented requirements and their safety properties. Section 4 contains a discussion of problems and solutions that arose during the case studies.
Analysis Technique
In this section, we brie y describe the models of SCR software requirements and CTL machines. We also present our automated technique for formalizing the software requirements and for transforming the event-driven requirements into a state-based CTL machine that can subsequently be analyzed.
Event-Driven Requirements Speci cations
SCR requirements were developed by a research group at NRL as part of a general Software Cost Reduction project 1, 19, 18] . The model they developed is based on compositional, event-driven, modemachines:
A mode is a set of system states that share a common property. A modeclass is a set of modes, and the union of the modes in a modeclass must cover the system's state space. The system is in exactly one mode of each modeclass at all times. A mode transition occurs between modes in the same modeclass as a result of system state changes. Mode transitions are speci ed by conditions and events, which comprise the machine's input language. Informally, each modeclass describes one aspect of the system's behavior, and the global behavior of the entire system is de ned by the composition of all the system's modeclasses.
Conditions and events
The input to the machines is the set of environmental conditions (e.g., whether a button is being pressed). All conditions are boolean, although rst-order predicate conditions that can be represented by a nite number of boolean conditions (such as integer ranges and timing constraints) are also expressible.
A system's behavior is de ned and controlled by changes to the conditions' values. A change to a condition's value is an event, and events are only detectable at the point in time at which they occur. For example, event @T(Cond1) speci es the point in time when the value of condition Cond1 changes from false to true. Similarly, event @F(Cond1) speci es the time when condition Cond1 becomes false. In these events, we call condition Cond1 the events' triggered condition. The occurrence of an event might also depend on the values of other conditions. For example, @T(Cond1) WHEN Cond2] describes the event of condition Cond1 becoming true while condition Cond2 is also true. In the above event, we call condition Cond2 the event's WHEN condition. More complex events can be created from simpler events and conditions using boolean operators.
SCR semantics propose three de nitions for an event occurrence and allow the requirements designer to decide which de nition pertains to each event 1]. For a given event @T(A) WHEN B] there is a We use the rst de nition for all event occurrences. This de nition allows us to distinguish between when conditions (which must be satis ed both before and at the time of the event) and triggered conditions (which must be unsatis ed immediately before the event and satis ed at the time of the event).
Modes and transitions
The system state is de ned by the current values of the system conditions, and the system state space is the set of all combinations of the conditions' values. To reduce of the size of the state space, sets of system states are collected into modes. The use of modes abstracts away details that do not contribute to the system's behavior; the values of all system conditions are not important at all times. In fact, the conditions' values are only important when they can a ect mode transitions.
A mode transition occurs between modes in the same modeclass as a result of the occurrence of an event. A transition's transition event speci es the event that triggers the transition. Mode transitions occur at the same time as their transition event and, like the event, take zero time units to complete. Two transitions from the same mode are simultaneously enabled if their transition events occur at the same time. In such a case, the modeclass is nondeterministic, and the activation of either transition (but not both) satis es the requirements. Table 1 is a requirements speci cation for a temperature control system. The speci cation consists of a single modeclass comprised of four modes: Off, meaning that the system is turned o ; Inactive, meaning that the system is on, but neither the heater nor the air conditioner is on; and Heat and AC, meaning that either the heater or the air conditioner, respectively, is on and controlling the temperature. Condition Running indicates whether or not the system has been turned on, and conditions BelowDesiredTemp, TempOK, and AboveDesiredTemp represent the current temperature.
The initial state of the system is mode Off, in which the system is not Running. The system is unde ned if Running initially true. Each row in the table speci es the event causing the transition from the mode on the left to the mode on the right. Each column in the center of the table represents a system condition. A table entry containing an upper-case letter (`@T' or`@F') signi es that the condition is a triggered condition of the transition event, and must change value (to true or false, respectively) to activate the mode transition. A table entry containing a lower-case letter (`t' and`f') signi es that the condition is a when condition of the transition event, and must have a particular value (true or false, respectively) both immediately before and at the time of the event occurrence. If a condition is neither a triggered condition nor a when condition of a transition event, then the corresponding table entry is marked with a hyphen (`{').
If the temperature control system is in mode Off and starts Running when the temperature is within desired limits, then it will enter mode Inactive. The AC comes on when the system is Inactive and the temperature rises above the desired temperature, or when the system starts Running while the temperature is above the desired temperature. The AC cycles o when the temperature falls to within 3 F of the desired temperature. Transitions into and out of mode Heat resemble those of mode AC. Some of the global constraints that one would expect to hold in a temperature control system are:
The rst four formulas state that whenever the system is in a particular mode, certain system conditions have invariant values. For example, if the system is in mode Heat, then the system is Running and the temperature is AboveDesiredTemp. The last two formulas state that if certain conditions hold then either the system is in a particular mode or the next system transition will be into that mode. For example, if the system is Running and the temperature is BelowDesiredTemp, then either the Heat is on or the Heat will come on imminently. SCR-style speci cations and global assertions provide di erent views of a system's requirements. Modes and mode transitions specify system properties that hold under certain conditions, whereas global assertions specify properties that must always hold. Thus, the global assertions are redundant information which already exists in the behavioral speci cation. We use this redundancy to ensure that an SCR tabular requirements speci cation enforces a system's invariant properties.
Formalizing SCR requirements
To enhance readability of SCR-style requirements, redundant information is often excluded from the tabular requirements. A row in a mode transition table speci es only the minimal set of triggered and when conditions the system designer needs to consider when determining whether or not the transition event has occurred. To the requirements and system designers, a condition value`{' in a transition event means that the value of the condition is not important in the detection of this event occurrence. However, to an analyzer, a condition value`{' in a transition event means that the event can occur regardless of the value of the condition. If a condition is restricted to a certain value (or set of values), then this knowledge should be explicitly stated in the requirements speci cation. Otherwise, invariant properties that depend on this missing information cannot be automatically veri ed.
The rst type of information missing from the tabular requirements pertains to relationships between condition values. For example, the temperature in a room cannot simultaneously be AboveDesiredTemp Table 2 : Mode transition tables with transitions due to simultaneous events.
being true, then it is also dependent upon conditions TempOK and BelowDesiredTemp being false. Our transformation algorithm accepts a set of condition relationships and propagates the information throughout the mode transition tables (the details of this process are described in 2]). It is important to note that these changes are not additional restrictions on the requirements; information from other parts of the requirements document (from the section that describes the conditions) is incorporated into the mode transition tables. The additional transition conditions in the temperature control system, due to the relationships between the temperature conditions, appear as bold characters in Table 2 . The second step in the formalization of SCR software requirements involves sequences of instantaneous mode transitions 2]. SCR mode transitions are instantaneous. Also, the system need not spend a minimum amount of time in a mode before exiting the mode. Therefore, if a mode's transition conditions are enabled at the time the mode is entered, a subsequent transition will occur and the system will e ectively spend no time in the intermediate mode. For example, if the temperature control system is in mode Heat, and somebody turns the system o at the same time as the temperature rises to TempOK, then transitions to modes Inactive and Off are both enabled. If the system nondeterministically enters the former mode, then (since mode transitions take zero time to complete) the system will enter mode Inactive at the instant the system is turned o , causing a subsequent transition to mode Off. Our transformation algorithm follows all sequences of simultaneous mode transitions (Heat-Inactive-Off) and adds them to the requirements speci cation as new distinct mode transitions (Heat-Off), whose transition event is the conjunction of the transition events of the transitions that compose the sequence (@F(Running) & @T(TempOK)). Mode transitions added to the temperature control system to represent sequences of instantaneous transitions appear in italics in Table 2 .
Next, the transformation algorithm detects all instances of nondeterminism in the speci cation and issues a warning message for each instance 2]. For example, in Table 2 Table 3 : Mode transition tables for deterministic temperature control system. the requirements designer must decided whether or not the nondeterminism should be allowed. The designer may purposely specify nondeterministic requirements so that nonessential design decisions can be delayed. Furthermore, unlike any of the formalization described so far, converting a nondeterministic requirements speci cation into a deterministic speci cation changes the semantics of the speci cation and forces additional restrictions on the designs that satisfy the requirements. Therefore, the designer is responsible for deciding whether and how a nondeterministic speci cation should be made deterministic. The temperature control system can be made nondeterministic by forcing condition Running to be a when condition of all transitions among modes Inactive, Heat, and AC (see Table 3 ). One of the results of this change to the speci cation is that there are no sequences of instantaneous mode transitions.
Finally, if the speci cation consists of multiple, concurrent modeclasses, the transformation algorithm composes the transition tables representing the di erent modeclasses into a single global tabular specication 2]. The resultant speci cation is in a form that can be formally analyzed. To use a particular analysis tool, one needs to transform the global tabular speci cation into the appropriate representation that the tool will accept. Our approach is to convert this speci cation into a CTL machine, which can then be analyzed using the CTL model checker.
State-Based Model Checking
If a system's behavioral requirements can be represented as a nite structure, and if the safety assertions can be expressed as propositional temporal logic formulas, then a model checker can be used to determine if the structure is a model of the logic formulas (and by implication, that the safety assertions hold in the requirements speci cation). We used an improved version of Clarke's EMC model checking system 8], called MCB 5], as our model checker.
Informally, the system is expressed as an extended nite state machine, in which each state is annotated with transition conditions (input condition values) and attributes (properties distinct from input conditions). The machine is in exactly one current state at all times. Once every time unit, one of the state's transitions is activated, leaving the machine in a possibly new current state. The values of the input conditions determine which of the current state's transitions is enabled. Since a transition is activated every time unit, at least one of the current state's transitions must be enabled at all times. This means that the disjunction of the current state's transition conditions must always be true. If more than one transition is enabled, then one is nondeterministically chosen and activated 2 . This state machine can serve as a temporal logic model of a system, and we can test whether safety properties phrased as temporal formulas hold in the model. The formulas are expressed in a propositional branching time logic called computational tree logic (CTL), whose operators permit explicit quanti cation over all possible futures. The syntax and semantics for CTL formulas are de Safety assertions are invariant, so the formulas we want to check are of the form AGf. The safety assertions for our temperature control system, described in section 2.1, are represented by the following CTL formulas:
The model checker accepts a CTL machine and a CTL formula, and determines whether or not the formula holds in the machine. If the model checker determines the formula f is true, then the safety property holds in the CTL state machine and also in the system requirements.
Mapping SCR requirements onto CTL machines
This section describes how to transform formalized SCR requirements into CTL machines. Most elements of the SCR requirements model correspond naturally to elements of CTL machines: SCR requirements CTL machine modes states mode transitions state transitions conditions input variables events ? There is no natural modeling of events in a CTL machine. CTL state transitions occur based on the current state and the current values of the input conditions. Mode transitions, on the other hand, occur at the time of their transition events; the system spends zero time in a mode once one of its transitions 2 Note that above de nition of a CTL machine di ers from the one used in the earlier EMC version of the model checker 8]. Previously, states were annotated with attributes, which consisted of both input conditions and output propositions. The state transitions were unconditional. To model conditional transitions, one had to create multiple instances of the source state and assign di erent values to the copies' input conditions. In the new de nition, all states annotated with the same set of output propositions are combined in a single state, and the transition conditions are related to the a state's transitions rather than to the state.
To Unfortunately, this intuitive representation does not model all desired properties of a mode. In particular, the invariant properties of the CTL mode state are not always equivalent to the invariant properties of the SCR mode that it represents. Mode invariants are the invariant properties of a system mode. A mode invariant must be true when the system enters the mode, must remain true while the system stays in the mode, and must either be true or become false when the system leaves the mode. For example in the temperature control system, condition Running is always false upon entering mode Off and the mode is always exited when Running becomes true. Therefore, Running is an invariant property of mode Off. State invariants, on the other hand, are conditions that are always true when the CTL machine is in that state. A state's output propositions are state invariants since they are properties of the state. In addition, since one of the state's transitions must be enabled at all times, any input condition that is a transition condition of all the state's transitions is also a state invariant.
The following examples show the circumstances under which our CTL representation of modes and transitions does not always accurately model mode invariants. They also describe how the representation can be re ned to handle these cases.
Example A: The model checking algorithm assumes that for each CTL state some outgoing transition is always enabled. Therefore, the disjunction of a state's transition conditions must always be true. This assumption can cause a formula that is stronger than the mode's invariant to be a provable invariant of the CTL mode state. Consider our CTL representation for a mode whose sole transition event is @F(C):
Since some transition from the current CTL state must be satis ed at all times, and since the CTL mode state in the above example has only one transition, its transition condition C is a state invariant of the CTL mode state. If condition C can be false when the system enters the mode, then C is not an invariant of the mode and there is a discrepancy between the invariant properties of the mode and the invariant properties of its representative CTL mode state. To ensure that the disjunction of a CTL mode state's transition conditions is no stronger than the mode's invariant, we add a transition from the CTL mode state back to itself and annotate it with the mode invariant:
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If C is a mode invariant, then the state invariant of the CTL mode state will not change with the addition of this transition. If C is not a mode invariant, then since the new transition is not annotated with it, C will not be a veri able state invariant.
Example B: Another problem with the representation is that a state invariant of a CTL mode state may not be as strong as the mode invariant of its associated mode. Consider a speci cation consisting of multiple modeclasses; the global mode-machine speci es the system's global modes (each the composition of one component mode from each modeclass) and the transitions between global modes. A transition event of a global transition is the conjunction of the transition events of a set of simultaneously occuring mode transitions. There is no guarantee that every global transition event will contain the source global mode's invariant. If it does not, then the mode invariant of the global mode will not be veri able. Consider our CTL representation for a global mode consisting of two component modes: 
Putting it together
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe our transformation for formalizing a semi-formal SCR requirements document and transforming it into a CTL machine representation. The steps of the methodology, and who is responsible for performing each step, are summarized below.
1. The requirements designer provides the tabular speci cations, and the initial conditions under which a mode is the initial mode of a modeclass. 2. The (human) requirements analyzer declares the relationships that hold among the environmental conditions. These relationships are manually transcribed from the section of the requirements document that describes the environmental conditions. 3. The transformation algorithm details the tabular requirements with respect to the declared condition relationships. 4. The transformation algorithm derives all possible sequences of instantaneous mode transitions and explicitly adds these sequences to the tables as`new' single mode transitions. 5. The transformation algorithm detects all instances of nondeterminism in the detailed speci cation and issues a warning message for each instance. 6. The requirements designer decides whether any of the detected instances of nondeterminism invalidate the intended requirements. For each instance of undesired nondeterminism, the requirements designer prioritizes the nondeterministic mode transitions and manually modi es the speci cation to enforce these priorities. 7. The transformation algorithm composes the mode transition tables (represented by multiple modeclasses) into a global SCR speci cation. 8. The transformation algorithm constructs a representative CTL machine from the global SCR speci cation. A more elaborate description of each of the above steps, and proofs that these steps preserve certain system properties, can be found in 2].
The above algorithm is part of our automated transformation algorithm that accepts an SCR tabular requirements speci cation and creates a representative CTL machine that can be analyzed using the CTL model checker. All of the CTL machines presented in this paper are represented graphically, as in Figure 1 . The ASCII notation used by the model checker is described in 5]. We used our analysis technique to analyze two requirements documents, one for an automobile cruise control system and one for a water-level monitoring system. The requirements speci cations of the two systems were originally speci ed using an alternate version of SCR requirements 19]; in this paper the speci cations appear in the new SCR mode table format 12], which is easier to read and understand. We transformed these systems' requirements into CTL machines, rephrased the required safety properties as logical formulas, and veri ed the formulas using the MCB model checker. In both studies, we found discrepancies between the systems' requirements speci cations and their safety assertions. Table 5 : Detailed mode transitions for adjusted cruise control speci cations.
Resume
Cruise control lever is set to resume The requirements document for the cruise control system also lists the following safety properties Whenever the system is in a particular mode, the associated safety assertion must hold. For example, if the system is in mode Off, then the automobile's ignition must be o . The safety assertion for mode Inactive is more complex: if the system is in mode Inactive, then the ignition is on, and either the engine is not running or the cruise control has not been activated. If any of these conditions does not hold, then the system should not be in the Inactive mode.
CTL Machine Construction
First, the transformation algorithm formalizes the software requirements. The following relationships were found in the requirements descriptions of the system conditions. Running ) Ignited Activate j Deactivate j Resume
The rst relationship states that the ignition must be on if the engine is running; the second relationship describes the cruise control lever conditions as members of an enumerated type, of which exactly one member is always true. Our transformation algorithm accepts condition relationships in the above format and propagates the information throughout the mode transition tables. For example, whenever the value of Activate is becoming true in the tables, the values of Deactivate and Resume are changed to either false (f) or becoming false (@F). A modi ed speci cation of the cruise control system is shown in Table 5 . The additional mode transition conditions due to the above variable interrelationships appear as bold characters. The next step of the formalization process explicates sequences of instantaneous mode transitions. For example, if the system is in mode Cruise and the driver depresses the brake pedal at the same time as the engine fails, then the system can transition from Cruise into Override (because the brakes are on) and immediately transition from Override into Inactive (because the engine has failed). Our transformation algorithm nds each sequence of simultaneous mode transitions (Cruise-Override-Inactive) and adds it to the requirements speci cation as a new distinct mode transition (Cruise-Inactive), whose transition event is the conjunction of the transition events of the transitions that compose the sequence (@F(Running) & @T(Brake).
This process reveals hidden instances of unintended nondeterminism in the speci cation. For example, the occurrence of the new compound event (@F(Running) & @T(Brake)) enables transitions to both Inactive and Override. The speci cation should only allow a transition into Override if the engine continues Running. A STATEMATE speci cation for a similar cruise control system 26] avoids this type of unintended nondeterminism by prioritizing the system's modes. STATEMATE speci cations model a system's behavior as a hierarchical state machine, where transitions from the same state are prioritized based on the level of the destination state. In the STATEMATE cruise control speci cation, the top level of the system consists of two states, Engine-Off and Engine-On 5 . State Engine-On represents an internal state machine that describes the system's behavior when the engine is on; it includes states CruiseAct and Cruise-Inact. (State Cruise-Act corresponds to mode Cruise, and state Cruise-Inact corresponds to mode Override). Since state Engine-Off is at a higher level in the speci cation than state Cruise-Inact, the transition from Cruise-Act to Engine-Off always takes precedence over the transition from Cruise-Act to Cruise-Inact. We can capture the precedence information represented as STATEMATE hierarchies by adding conditions to mode transitions. Table 5 contains an adjusted cruise control speci cation in which some of the transitions have additional constraints on their enabling conditions to prevent them from being enabled when a transition of higher priority is enabled. For example, a transition from Cruise to Override can only occur:
if the ignition is on (disabling the transition to Off), the engine is running (disabling a transition to Inactive), and the automobile is not going too fast (disabling the other transition to Inactive) The additional conditions added to prevent nondeterminism appear in italics in Table 5 . There are no sequences of instantaneous mode transitions in the adjusted speci cation.
The CTL machine that corresponds to the adjusted cruise control speci cations is shown in Figure 2 .
Analysis
Once the CTL machine has been created, we can verify that the tabular speci cations and the relationships between conditions were entered correctly. To do this, we rephrase the requirements speci cations as liveness properties, and use the MCB model checker to prove that they are true with respect to the 5 The STATEMATE speci cation does not distinguish between the ignition being on and the engine running. constructed machine. For each mode transition, we create two CTL formulas that state if the CTL machine is in the transition's source mode and the transition event occurs, then the machine will transition into the transition's destination mode. The following formulas represent the rst mode transition from Cruise to Override in Table 5 ; output proposition Exit is used to distinguish between the system being in the mode ( Exit) and the sytem exiting the mode (Exit Brake) ; then in the state after that, the system will be in the destination mode (Override). The second formula states that the hypothesis of the rst formula is not false, thereby precluding the possibility that the rst formula is determined to be true because it is vacuously true.
Being able to verify that the speci cation has been entered correctly is a secondary feature. Most importantly, we can verify that the CTL machine enforces the speci cation's intended invariant properties. The next set of formulas are the required properties that were listed in the requirements document, restated as CTL formulas The rst formula states that the ignition is o whenever the system is in CTL mode state Off. This formula was found not to be invariant. The system always exits Off when Ignited becomes true. However, Ignited is not always false upon entering Off; since the system can initially start in mode Off under any initial conditions. If the initial conditions are changed such that the system starts in Off only if Ignited (and the system is otherwise unde ned), then the rst formula becomes invariantly true.
The fourth formula states that whenever the system is in CTL mode state Cruise, then the ignition is on, the engine is running, and the brake is not being pressed. This formula was also found not to be invariant, because Brake is not an invariant property of Cruise. The transition that causes the system to leave mode Cruise when the brake is pressed is not unconditional (see Table 5 ); if the vehicle is going Toofast, then the transition is not enabled. Brake would be an invariant property of Cruise if when condition Toofast were removed from the transition or if Toofast were an invariant property of Cruise. The presence of when condition Toofast in this transition is needed to prevent the system from transitioning into Override when it should be transitioning into Inactive. (The transitions into Inactive have priority over those into Override.) Besides, the system really should not be in CTL mode state Cruise if the automobile is going too fast. To make Toofast an invariant property of Cruise, we must modify the speci cation so that Toofast is false whenever the system enters Cruise (i.e., we force Toofast to be a when condition in all transitions entering Cruise). Since the system unconditionally leaves mode Cruise when Toofast becomes true, Toofast is a mode invariant of Cruise in the modi ed speci cations. This means that Brake is also an invariant property of the Cruise in the modi ed speci cations, and that the fourth formula stated above is invariant.
Lastly, the third formula to be veri ed: AG ((Inactive & Exit) ! (Ignited & ( Running j Activate)) was also found not be invariant. This formula states that if the cruise control is Inactive, then the ignition is on and either the engine is not running or the cruise control has not been activated. However, if the cruise control is Inactive, and a driver depresses the brake when the engine is running and then sets the cruise control lever to Activate, there is no transition to Cruise because the brake is on. Thus it is possible to be in mode Inactive when the ignition is on, the engine is running, and the cruise control has been activated.
In fact, a presumably corrected version of this formula also did not hold: AG ((Inactive & Exit) ! (Ignited & ( Running j Brake j Activate)) Consider the above scenario, where the cruise control is Inactive, the engine is Running, the Brake is depressed, and the driver sets the cruise control lever to Activate. The system remains in mode Inactive because the Brake is being pressed. If the driver then releases the brake but continues to hold the cruise control lever in the Activate position, the cruise control will still remain Inactive and the invariant will be violated.
We believe the intended invariant properties of mode Inactive are that the ignition is on and either the engine is not running the brake is on the cruise control lever has not been activated, or the cruise control was activated, but not at a time when the other cruise control conditions held. The mode invariant needs to be changed to address this fourth case, which di ers from the rst three in that it deals with the values of the variables at a particular time (when the cruise control lever is changed and set to Activate). These properties can be expressed by the following formula
